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Abstract 
Narrative Medicine is a clinical practice, a scholarly field, and a site of intensive research world-
wide. This essay describes the inauguration of the field of narrative medicine in 2000 at Columbia 
University in New York, NY, USA and the principles and practices that have devolved from the 
initiating work. Clinical implications of narrative concepts of health care as learned from actual 
medical practice are described. The three movements of narrative medicine—attention, represen-
tation, and affiliation—are explored as means of engaging participants in creative acts of discovery 
and relation. Examples are provided of narratively-informed teaching and health care practice. 
Conceptual frameworks from aesthetic theory, phenomenology, literary and narrative theories, 
and cognitive sciences are advanced to portray the integrated study of individuals-in-the-world 
made possible by contemporary narrative medicine thought. Emerging concepts of enchantment, 
embodiment, and enactivism suggest future directions for the field. 
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1. Introductory Scenes 
A first-year Columbia University medical student, Andrew Chen, stands in front of Max 
Beckmann’s surreal Bird’s Hell at the Metropolitan Museum of Art as part of his required 
course in Narrative Medicine (Beckmann, Chen). He describes what he sees: a “grotesque 
portrayal of torment and violence.” A man is being sliced open by a large bird, who itself 
seems to be being wounded by the blade it wields; a four-breasted woman erupts from a 
giant bird shell. A big laughing bird eats a smaller bird alive. Mr. Chen calls it a “location 
of perpetual suffering.” He may or may not know that the German Beckmann wrought 
this 1938 work as an allegory of Nazism, having been forced to  flee from Hitler’s perse-
cution of “degenerate” artists. One way or the other, the student finds himself, without 
having meant to, coming to an awareness of the lived reality of his suicidal patient always 
seeking means to harm herself. In front of this painting, he sees something about his pa-
tient he could not otherwise see.  
A group of social workers, nurses, physicians, and writers, most of them strangers, 
brainstormed in a narrative medicine workshop on means to improve health care team 
collaboration. I read with them the first page-and-a-half of Michael Ondaatje’s novel The 
English Patient—the scene-setting in which Hana the nurse cares for the fatally burned pilot 
in the abandoned post-WWII Italian estate, an excerpt of which I reproduce here: 
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She stands up in the garden. She has sensed a shift in the weather. . . . She turns and moves 
uphill towards the house. . . .  She turns into the room which is another garden—this one 
made up of trees and bowers painted over its walls and ceiling. The man lies on the bed, his 
body exposed to the breeze.  
Every four days she washes his black body, beginning at the destroyed feet. . . . She has 
nursed him for months and she knows the body well, the penis sleeping like a sea horse, the 
thin tight hips. Hipbones of Christ, she thinks. . . . She puts her hand into her pocket. She 
unskins the plum with her teeth, withdraws the stone and passes the flesh of the fruit into 
his mouth. 
He whispers again, dragging the listening heart of the young nurse beside him to wher-
ever his mind is, into that well of memory he kept plunging into during those months before 
he died. (3-4) 
 
As we talk about the text, my readers recognize the doubly ironized Edenic scene, the 
inside-out Christian iconography, the innocent erotics of clinical care, the blasted well of 
memory. I give them a writing prompt—“Write about a room of care”—and each one 
falls into his or her own well of memory, going without friction to the bedside of a patient 
20 years ago, to the aftermath of a recollected childhood tonsillectomy,  or to yesterday’s 
session of a decade-long psychoanalytic treatment. Clustered in groups of 4 or 5, they read 
to one another what they wrote, recognizing the forms and moods and plots of one an-
other’s texts. They experience the startling ease of discovery through writing, bringing with 
it a lucky and rare chance at intersubjective contact. 
These examples of Mr. Chen’s seminar at the Metropolitan Museum of Art and my 
workshop on health care team collaboration demonstrate some of the methods and goals 
of narrative medicine. Following a brief account of the rise of this field, I will suggest some 
of the principles that underlie this work and some emerging directions at the boundaries 
between medicine and narratology in which the field is heading.  
 
 
2. The Rise of Narrative Medicine 
Medical Humanities and Literature and Medicine arose in the early 1970s, bringing ways 
of knowing from the humanities into contact with clinicians and clinical trainees. Early on, 
we felt it an accomplishment to assign a Chekhov story in a medical school course or to 
read a poem at attending rounds in the hospital. On the background of this early work in 
literature and medicine, my practice of general internal medicine at Columbia taught me 
how much I needed to learn about how stories work, and I was happy that the Columbia 
English department accepted me into their doctoral program. As my knowledge of a Jame-
sian and psychoanalytically-inflected narratology deepened, my clinical practice and my 
teaching in the medical school were  transformed. My patients and I found new ways to 
understand one another through complex forms of writing together. I would write down 
what I had heard a patient tell me and then ask the patient to read what I wrote, in effect 
asking, “Did I get it right?” Several things would happen when a patient read what I wrote. 
Usually, he or she would correct things I had gotten wrong in my written representation 
of the patient’s account of illness. But then, often, the patient would say, “We left some-
thing out.” And then I would learn about deaths, loss, or trauma. A stillborn child had 
never been grieved. A fire destroyed the childhood home of a patient in South America. 
Sometimes, I’d learn about gifts and strengths—a time in prison on drug charges produced 
volumes of poetry. A film school assignment had led to a  statement of self of a young 
cinema student. A so-called “dual diagnosis” psychotic young man—in addition to his 
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mental illness, he had been a heroin user and heavy drinker—found Jesus, stopped all his 
substance use, and became able to live peacefully with his persistent auditory hallucina-
tions.  
Some of my colleagues began to recognize similar shifts in their clinical practices. Un-
like the more academic model of medical humanities, what we were doing felt like a clinical 
discipline, for the humanities-inflected work changed what came to matter in a patient’s 
care. In 2000, I coined the name “Narrative Medicine” to signify this work, being careful 
to choose a name that would not immediately drive away my clinician colleagues the way 
the word “humanities” could—humanities, humanism, humanitarianism, humane were all 
clumped into a category of “soft stuff” back then. By publishing papers about this fresh 
frame for clinical work in the medical journals, we tried to legitimate the inclusion of nar-
rative knowledge and methods within a health care practice. (Charon 2001, DasGupta et 
al, 2006) 
A group of scholars, clinicians, and writers joined with me in 2003 to think systemati-
cally about why literary and narrative work in clinical settings might help clinicians and 
their patients. With funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities, we met 
regularly over 2 years to take up these questions. The group included Victorianist and 
cinema scholar Maura Spiegel, phenomenologist Craig Irvine, novelist David Plante (re-
placed by novelist Nellie Hermann when Plante moved from New York), pediatrician and 
activist Sayantani DasGupta, psychoanalyst Eric Marcus, graduate students Rebecca Gar-
den and Tara McGann, and patient advocacy student-intern Patricia Stanley, all of us en-
gaged in some way with writing about and teaching humanities and medicine. 
We taught one another theoretical frameworks from our disciplines that shed light on 
our questions—D.W.Winnicott on play and reality, Adam Smith on moral sentiment, bell 
hooks and Paulo Freire on liberatory teaching, Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the body, Henry 
James on the novel. Intersubjectivity, social justice, embodiment, relationality, reflexivity, 
creativity, and doubt were the signal concepts we worked with, while close reading and 
creative writing became signature methods of our work. We conceptualized and undertook 
research projects to learn about the consequences of this work in various settings (Das-
Gupta and Charon 2004; Sands, Stanley, Charon 2008). With the inspiration of a number 
of consultants doing stellar work in medical humanities elsewhere,  we emerged with a 
conceptual framework that focused on the development of attention, the necessity of writ-
ing or other forms of representation, and the ultimate goals of affiliation with patients, 
colleagues, society, and the self. By designing and teaching graduate courses and intensive 
introductory workshops for clinicians, we honed our original theoretical notions into a 
systematic and coherent set of principles and practices (Charon 2006). These have since 
been borne out in practice. 
Since then, this work has evolved outward, inward, and depthward. (Irvine; Heiserman 
and Spiegel; Charon 2011; Spencer; Charon, Hermann, Devlin; Charon, DasGupta, Her-
mann et al). Our confluence of primary care medicine, narratology, literary theory, and 
phenomenology has evolved into a fluid, international, many-sourced convergence of 
thought and practice. From quarters as diverse as Zen Buddhist contemplative practice, 
relational psychoanalytic theory, and postcolonial theory, we and our colleagues have ar-
ticulated rich, provocative, bottomless challenges to the current injustices and failures of 
health care (Lewis, Schafer, Tsevat). Our narrative medicine project at Columbia, initially 
funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities and subsequently by the National 
Institutes of Health and the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, has matured into required cur-
riculum in narrative medicine in all four years of Columbia’s medical school, a Master of 
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Science in Narrative Medicine degree at Columbia University, interprofessional education 
for students and faculty from 8 of Columbia’s schools and programs in the health profes-
sions, thousands of persons trained in the basics of narrative medicine at intensive work-
shops at our medical school, a low-residence certification program soon to launch for 
distance learning, national and international partners working with us worldwide to de-
velop narrative medicine programs elsewhere, and productive collaborative contact with 
groups far outside health care who find in the principles and practice of narrative medicine 
something of value. 
By no means a unitary field by now, narrative medicine has come to stand for a set of 
convictions and methods that fortify clinical practice with narrative skills to listen, to rec-
ognize, to witness, and to be moved to action on behalf of patients through close attention 
to their situations. We hope that our underlying commitments to attention, representation, 
and affiliation continue to guide others who join us in this effort to improve patient care 
through strengthening clinicians’ narrative capacities. 
 
 
3. Interior Interlude 
I have been thinking lately about the underneath of my work. While teaching internal 
medicine and narrative medicine (sadly, they are not yet synonymous) and caring for pa-
tients, I have come to see, gradually, the ways in which my own evolving narrative skills 
have exposed the world to me. I go through days now simply seeing more than I used to 
see. The steady habits of attention and representation, born of narrative practice, have 
grooved into my ways in the world. I accept invitations from far and near to facilitate 
narrative medicine seminars and workshops, because every time I teach narrative medi-
cine, I get to write myself. I might bring a poem, a paragraph from a novel, or an operative 
note dictated after surgery; or I might show a series of Salgado photographs, maybe a pair 
of Cézanne card players, a few savage Hoppers. I might play a recording of Gershwin’s 
“Rhapsody in Blue” or the slow movement of Schumann’s violin concerto in D minor. 
We talk about what we see, what we notice, what we wonder about. And then I give a 
writing prompt, an invitation created to expand the mind, with around five minutes in 
which to write. At the close of our silent minutes, many participants are eager to read aloud 
what they’ve written. They’ve surprised themselves into writing, and they then become 
one another’s readers, able always to help the writer to recognize what he or she has dis-
covered in the act of writing. Thus is created an intersubjective space of recognition, a 
demonstration of creativity, and always a narrative discovery of self and other. When done 
longitudinally, these narrative medicine seminars develop into clearings of safety and trust 
where colleagues or classmates experience mutual respect that “spills out” onto the ward, 
into student life, and toward self-making. It becomes a part of life. 
In ways that I have had to live through to understand, I see now that my own narrative- 
medicine-prompted writings constitute a record of perception that in turn stirs a round of 
experience. Writing about an experience, no matter how far or near in time, enables one 
to undergo it, or at least to experience it anew. Not a journal, not a diary, not bits of an 
essay, each of these spontaneous compositions, written in the shadow of a great text or 
image or composition and surfaced through an exposing contact with others who share 
my commitment to discovery stands as a fragment of an increasingly powerful miscellany 
of self. Subtending the practical clinical routines of narrative medicine practice, the schol-
arship and research, the teaching, and the moves toward social justice that our work entails 
lies the mysteriously powerful individual-facing-the-world/world-engaging-the-individual 
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capacity to be embroiled in the moment; to not squander any aspect of what is given; to 
be alive to the time, space, sound, sense, words, line, and beauty of the beheld; and to do 
this all with others who are doing the same thing. The dividend is not only to sense the 
worth and the cost of this thing we call living but also to catch a glimpse of its meaning. 
 
 
4. Attention, Representation, Affiliation 
The skilled perceiver—whether of a painting, a poem, a partita, or a patient in the Emer-
gency Room—exposes what can be observed in one act of witness. Shocked into attention, 
the observer achieves what Husserl named the phenomenological reduction, whereby the 
“natural attitude” of unexamined assumptions is bracketed away, leaving the beholder rad-
ically fresh to undergo an unsullied experience of the beheld. Required in aesthetic, crea-
tive, and clinical work, such heightened attention invests the observer in the fate of the 
observed, donating the presence of that observer to reveal what is to be seen or heard. 
Abstract expressionist Mark Rothko has a name for the state of the witness’s attention: in 
the gallery notes posted at London’s Tate Modern installation of Rothko’s Seagram murals, 
Rothko explains that he insists on dim lighting and proper seating where his paintings are 
displayed so that viewers can achieve a state of “absorption.” Absorbed in his or her acts 
of looking, wondering, interpreting, the viewer “absorbs” the painting itself, almost like 
an act of ingestion. The paintings, when granted full absorption or attention, become a 
part of self, while the witness contributes to the on-going life of the work. 
John Dewey insists that such acts of perception constitute experience. In Art as Experi-
ence, Dewey proposes that aesthetic events are transformative eruptive events that change 
the viewer. We do not passively gaze at or listen to great art; rather we are crucibled in our 
entanglements with them. “Perception . . . is an act of  reconstructive doing, and con-
sciousness becomes fresh and alive. This act of seeing involves the cooperation of motor 
elements . . . as well as coöperation of all funded ideas that may serve to complete the new 
picture that is forming. . . . Perception  is an act of the going-out of energy in order to 
receive, not a withholding of energy” (Dewey 54-55, italics in original). When done inten-
tionally—having put into place Husserl’s phenomenological reduction—the perceiver is 
exposed to the matter of the art, its creator, and reflexively to the one doing the perceiving.  
This helps to explain the clinical transaction. When done properly, the witness—the 
doctor, nurse, social worker, physical therapist, clinic secretary—is wholly present. The 
state of attention, like Rothko’s absorption, heightens the witness’s availability to the pa-
tient. During their transaction, nothing exists for the clinician but the situation of the pa-
tient. Freud’s “evenly hovering attention” is not reserved for the psychoanalyst but is 
achievable by any clinician properly trained to respond to the call of the sick person. My 
team’s exploration of the narrative dimensions of health care has convinced us that the 
clinician’s absorption in or attention to the situation of the patient is akin to the close 
reader/observer’s experience in front of a text or an image or the close listener’s transport 
by a piece of music. The “receiver” of text, vision, or sound takes in, engulfs, accepts, does 
not turn away from that which is being perceived, thereby igniting the process itself of 
perception. Such a form of reception of what patients unveil is what we hope to achieve 
as clinicians. 
The next step in this process requires creativity. One does not perceive something until 
one represents it in some medium—words, painting, sculpture, movement, music, maybe 
dream. Philosopher and aesthetic theorist Nelson Goodman writes, “The object as we 
look upon or conceive it [is] a version or construal of the object. In representing an object, 
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we do not copy such a construal or interpretation—we achieve it” (Goodman 9, italics in 
the original). Representation here refers to the conferring of form on an erstwhile formless 
experience. Goodman asserts that the act of conferring form on the perceived is what 
makes the perceived visible, either to the one seeing it or others who can now learn about 
it, not as a “copy” in the mind that is filed away for future reference, but as a creative 
invention, an artisanal craft, a something where there had been nothing, a making, resulting 
in a drawing, a paragraph, a partita, a poem. Writers and writing teachers know that writing 
is discovery, that the writer gains access to that which is known by virtue of composing its 
description. Writing scholar Ann Berthoff’s “Learning the Uses of Chaos” explains this 
concept clearly: 
 
We don't have ideas which we put into words; we don't  think of what we want to say and 
then write. In composing, we make meanings. We find the forms of thought by means of 
language and we find the forms of language by taking thought. . . . Meanings do not come 
out of the air; we make  them out of a chaos of images, half-truths, remembrances, syntactic 
fragments, from the mysterious and unformed. (648) 
 
The perceiver may, then, have a duty to represent what is observed or noticed or, in the 
case of the creative writer, imagined. Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes that “the artist is the 
one who arrests the spectacle in which most men take part without really seeing it and 
who makes it visible to the most ‘human’ among them” (Merleau-Ponty 18). This may be 
the case with the clinician too, this imperative to “arrest” what is witnessed in the clinic or 
the hospital ward and to make it visible to those who seek care and those who try to give 
it. The one who represents what is observed or undergone—whether clinician or artist—
produces a unique réalization (the French “réalization,” unlike English’s “realization,” 
means not just recognizing something but accomplishing, implementing, carrying out—
the “réalization” of a movie is done by the film’s director. It is to make something real.)  
By coupling attention with representation, narrative medicine recognizes that creative rep-
resentation toward interpretation and visibility is a necessary part of clinical practice. We 
insist that our students and trainees write or otherwise represent  what they observe, 
thereby providing them with tools with which to fully perceive it. Narrative medicine’s 
practices of attention and representation spiral toward affiliation, the partnerships and mu-
tual commitments that stand as the ultimate goals of health care. Whether with the indi-
vidual patient, the clinical colleague, the public engaged in health care issues, or the self, 
this affiliation brings forth the powerful dividends of narrative medicine work. 
There is an obligatory social and even intersubjective dimension of representation, for 
every writer needs a reader. “No object of composition, that is, no work of art, exists in 
the absence of a spectator,” wrote aesthetic theorist (and brother of Gertrude) Leo Stein 
(Stein 51). Even the most secretive diarist asks himself or herself in another time to func-
tion as “surrogate other” to read what has been written. Isolated acts of perception may 
be accomplished in solitude, but acts of representation remain radically unfinished until 
they are received in the world by another. W.J.T. Mitchell makes this clear even in the title 
of his What Do Pictures Want?, in which he explores the intrigues, invitations, and sensual 
to’s-and-fro’s between an image and its on-looker as well as between an image and its 
creator. “Like people,” Mitchell suggests, “pictures may not know what they want; they 
have to be helped to recollect it through a dialogue with others” (Mitchell 46). Pictures, or 
representations, are not just copies. Concepts of mimesis have undergone radical shifts 
away from the Aristotelian model of being copies of things toward being recognized as 
autonomous, sensuous, wily, original supplements to the initiating stimulus that themselves 
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constitute a “real” while calling into question the “reality” of the thing being “copied” 
(Derrida 141-64, Taussig 44-46). The series of supplements to the inciting thing beheld 
provides “a sensuous knowledge in our time, a knowledge that in adhering to the skin of 
things through realist copying disconcerts and entrances by spinning off into fantastic for-
mations” (Taussig 44). Although each copy might well realistically “adhere to the skin of 
things” being observed, each supplement, coming from a singular observer, cannot help 
but achieve a fresh, entrancing, even fantastic, view of the thing observed. Such formations 
are the genesis of knowledge. 
 
 
5. Enchantment, Embodiment, and Enactivism 
Attention and representation may indeed result in entrancing, or enchanting, knowledge. 
The opposite of entrancement or enchantment, disenchantment is easily enough identified 
around and within us these days. In early 2016, an enormous billboard occupied the face 
of a large industrial building on First Avenue around 23rd Street in New York City . The 
sign had to have been two or three stories high and as wide. The background was painted 
a deep matte charcoal. A black circle occupied most of the great square. At the very bottom 
of the circle, in an arc of perhaps 30o, was a slim crescent of moss green. The tag line read: 
“It is not warming. It is dying.”  
Such disenchantment or disillusionment—“Don’t kid yourself; what is happening to 
the globe cannot be fixed”—is a routine staple in political and social life. Max Weber’s 
elegy for the enchantment of the pre-industrial revolution world continues to ring true 
today (Weber). Believing that things will improve is ridiculed as naïveté or, worse, proof of 
having been taken in by the enemy. An example of saturating disenchantment arises in 
literary criticism. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in Touching, Feeling, called for a hermeneutics of 
reparation to replace what Paul Ricoeur named the hermeneutics of suspicion, the decon-
structionist form of criticism in which the critic undoes the text, going after the sup-
pressed, the repressed, that which lies hidden under the surface of the text, exposing what-
ever the writer was “up to” with or without having known it. In her Uses of Literature and 
The Limits of Critique, literary scholar Rita Felski joins Sedgwick in challenging this suspi-
cion-riddled doxa of literary criticism, proposing instead that “reading involves a logic of 
recognition; that aesthetic experience has analogies with enchantment in a supposedly disen-
chanted age” (Uses, 14).  
Following the lead of Sedgwick and Felski, narrative medicine, too, seeks to replace 
mainstream medicine’s hermeneutics of suspicion with a hermeneutics of reparation. Rou-
tine medical language reveals a surprising and unnecessary stance of suspicion—a patient 
is reported as having “denied chest pain” if she simply said that her chest does not hurt. 
More fundamentally, the act itself of diagnosis can seem to embroil the clinician in a de-
tective-like enterprise of gathering clues to expose disease, a disease often unbeknownst 
to the one who harbors it. We “suspect” tuberculosis or HIV in trying to diagnose a fever 
of unknown origin. This mode of suspicion can carry with it the impression that the patient 
is trying to hide something from the snooping detective: remember in William Carlos Wil-
liams’s story “The Use of Force,” the febrile little girl fights against the exposure of her 
diphtheric throat: “I forced the heavy silver spoon back of her teeth and down her throat 
till she gagged. And there it was—both tonsils covered with membrane. She had fought 
valiantly to keep me from knowing her secret” (Williams 60). 
Instead of a hermeneutics of suspicion, narrative medicine methods allow the clinician 
to enter the narrative world of patients, trying to imagine what it might be like to live in it, 
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accepting the role of guest in the life-world of the patient. And so, when a narratively 
trained clinician represents a patient’s account of illness or even represents that patient’s 
body or mood or behavior, the representational act is accomplished, in part anyway, from 
the perspective of the subject, seeking not only to report what can be seen by the observer 
but also to capture something of the patient’s lived experience. To do this requires some-
thing beyond a reductive replicative observation and report; it requires an intersubjective 
gamble, letting more than facts travel across that semi-permeable membrane between cli-
nician and patient. 
An enchantment is experienced, I submit, by both the observer and the observed when 
the hermeneutics of suspicion are bypassed. In clinical settings, a diagnostic interview not 
governed by suspicion becomes a conversation. The bureaucratic or biomedical transac-
tion opens up, retaining room to accomplish the technical tasks at hand while inviting the 
unpredictable, mysterious, pleasurable experience of making contact with another.  I 
learned to open interviews with a new patient with the simple invitation, “Tell me what 
you think I should know about your situation.” If I listen without writing, typing, or inter-
rupting, chair rolled away from the computer monitor, hands-in-lap and absorptive, I learn 
exactly what a doctor would have to know in order to be of help. Since the work of med-
icine involves the patient’s body, life, and health, its transactions are by definition charac-
terized by bodily contact, intimate talk about emotions, and discourse (however hedged) 
about meaning. Although much of mainstream health care, sadly, is conducted without 
any meaningful interpersonal contact between clinician and patient, narrative medicine 
routines like my opening question can encourage a deeply personal engagement, mutual 
investment, bilateral trust, and the willingness to be exposed one to the other. This bilateral 
engagement—whether with an individual patient, a colleague, or the general public—is 
what we mean by affiliation, the third movement of narrative medicine. Is it a surprise that 
the ensuing relationship not only can do effective health care work but also brings both 
participants satisfaction and even joy? (Charon 2012). 
Perhaps the presence of the body in medicine is what will save it from being destroyed 
by corporate greed and revenue-hungry institutional priorities. Almost all forms of health 
care—excepting psychiatric and psychoanalytic practices—involve touch of one body by 
another. Sometimes the contact is painful; sometimes it is invasive; sometimes it borders 
on the assaultive. Medical touch must be sanitized so as to guard against inappropriateness, 
and yet, when effective, it retains elements of support, comfort, and recognition. The body 
of the clinician, though, is typically overlooked. Those who work among the sick and dying 
can trick themselves into believing that their exposure to sickness will somehow render 
them immune to illness or death themselves. Mortality exists on the other side of a divide, 
many convince themselves, even though doctors and nurses do not typically indulge in 
magical thinking. What would happen if physicians and other clinicians could accept their 
own bodily frailty, could appreciate and accept their existential parity with their patients? 
I find that my narrative medicine practice gives me opportunities to learn, from my pa-
tients, that I  too will become ill and that I too will die. Stabilizing, this gradually dawning 
realization intensifies the contact the clinician can make with patients. Once achieved, this 
realization allows the clinician to be present in the medical office or hospital ward as an 
embodied person, joining the patient—who is by definition present with his or her body 
and life and health—in equality. The shared predicament of a measured life brings patient 
and clinician within reach of one another, facing, eventually, the same mysterious end. 
How, now, to consider the meeting between the embodied patient and the embodied 
physician? Help in considering this question comes from a surprising source: the branch 
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of cognitive sciences called the embodied or enacted mind. Study of mind, brain, and be-
havior has exploded since the cognitive revolution of the 1940s released psychology from 
behaviorism to let it wonder about the mind (Miller). By the 1970s, the more and more 
sophisticated technological ability to image the brain’s structure and analyze its actions 
allowed cognitive scientists to locate functions in the brain and to map the neural networks 
that undergird every action from waving a hand to writing a sonnet. Compared by many 
neuroscientists to a super-computer, the brain was conceptualized as a formidable infor-
mation-processing input-output machine able to use vast amounts of stored data and sig-
nals from sensory perception to inform and guide behavior in a linear or predictable or 
even programmed way.    
A fork in the cognitive sciences road opened up in the 1990s between the so-called 
representationists and the enactivists. Using a concept of “representation” that differs fun-
damentally from my use of it in this essay, representationists assert that the brain makes 
internal cognitive models of the real world, laying them down in memory and consulting 
these cognitive models as the basis for action. Enactivists propose that the perceived world 
is experienced by the embodied subject, not by registering, filing, and later consulting with 
cognitive representations of things and events but rather by moving through the sensate 
world and acting on the basis of the mind/brain/body’s experience of it. In The Embodied 
Mind, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch introduce the term enactivism: “We propose as a name 
the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representa-
tion of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a 
mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs” 
(Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 9). 
A tremendous challenge to the reigning paradigms of the time, enactivism recentered  
brain studies on the individual person, making his or her way through a world that includes 
light and sound, touch and movement, beliefs and ideas, love and hate, imagination and 
beauty. Beyond motor control of one’s limbs or the capacity to compute complex calcu-
lations, the brain  could be conceptualized as one of several actors in the development of 
contact between an individual and the world. Such concepts allow philosophers, psycholo-
gists, physiologists, linguists, and artists to think together about a life of the mind, a life of 
“its” body, and the creation of a reality birthed between them and the world. That these 
ideas emerge from within cognitive science, arguably the most authoritative voice speaking 
today of matters of thought and experience, offers a tremendous opportunity to influence 
this conversation while directly challenging some of it most fundamental and faulty as-
sumptions. The implications for health care of the shift from representationist to enactivist 
models of the mind are vast, especially for fields, like narrative medicine, that strive to 
counter fragmentation and reductionism in understanding human beings’ lived experience.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In caring for patients or in teaching others to do so, narrative medicine practitioners seek 
to reconcile biological and experiential phenomena toward an ecological awareness of 
health and consciousness. Appreciating, as social constructivists, the on-going creation of 
reality by those embroiled in it, we are on a quest to learn how to recognize the thick, rich, 
messy terrain of an individual person’s life. In effect, enactivist models join with narrato-
logical models to make possible a storied grasp of an individual’s subjective experience, 
melding temporal, spatial, sensual, relational experience into a singularly meaningful oc-
currence. What more important domain for these ideas to achieve influence than in the 
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settings of health care, where physical sensations, biological states, mental perceptions, 
and the existential consciousness are exposed and their meanings sought?  Where else do 
we, finally, confront and live in the shadow of our own deaths? 
This moment is worth seizing. The shock of attention opened Andrew Chen to new 
and consequential dimensions of knowledge about a suicidal patient. The shock of atten-
tion moved my health care team members to recognize the gardens in their own lives. 
Exposure to creativity, like Dewey said, engaged them all in acts of reconstructive doing, 
acts of making. In the light of post-deconstructive thought of reparation, vanguard think-
ing in cognitive science, and the mysteries of being beckoned toward enchantment, narra-
tive medicine keeps growing, seeking, learning, never knowing. We welcome others in 
continuing to create this field of narrative medicine, to be poised to pay attention to what 
it next reveals, and to be ever committed to the health of patients who seek unified, rec-
ognizing, and effective care. 
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